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Abstract Dual process theory proposes two distinct rea-
soning processes in humans, an intuitive style that is rapid
and automatic and a deliberative style that is more effort-
ful. However, no study to date has specifically examined
these reasoning styles in relation to the autism spectrum.
The present studies investigated deliberative and intuitive
reasoning profiles in: (1) a non-clinical sample from the
general population with varying degrees of autism traits
(n = 95), and (2) males diagnosed with ASD (n = 17)
versus comparisons (n = 18). Taken together, the results
suggest reasoning on the autism spectrum is compatible
with the processes proposed by Dual Process Theory and
that higher autism traits and ASD are characterised by a
consistent bias towards deliberative reasoning (and poten-
tially away from intuition).
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Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental
disorder of unknown underlying etiology characterised by
persistent deficits in social communication and social
interaction combined with restricted, repetitive patterns of
behaviour, interests, or activities (APA 2013) with preva-
lence estimates up to one in 68 children (CDC 2015). A
continuum of autism traits extend throughout the general
population until they become clinically significant under
ASD diagnostic criteria to form part of an ‘autism spec-
trum’ of autistic presentation (Constantino and Todd 2003;
Plomin et al. 2009; Posserud et al. 2006; Wing 1988; see
Ruzich et al. 2015, for systematic review). Ruzich et al.
report that, within the general population, males have sig-
nificantly higher levels of autism traits than females, and
those with ASD have significantly higher autism traits than
males from the general population (with no sex differences
in autism traits within the ASD population).
Reasoning and decision making are core human capa-
bilities that enable effective participation within society,
yet have received relatively little attention within the aut-
ism spectrum literature. Reasoning in a manner which is
normatively logical and subsequent rational decision
making are specialised higher cognitive functions attrib-
uted to common processing mechanisms (see Evans and
Stanovich 2013). Luke et al. (2012) identified three core
features of reasoning and decision making that were par-
ticularly problematic for people with ASD using a self-
report methodology. Decisions were difficult to make for
people with ASD if they involved talking to others;
involved a change in routine; or if the decision has to be
made quickly. Whilst difficulties talking with others and
changes in routine reflect the core diagnostic features of
ASD (respectively), the difficulty with rapid decision
making for those with ASD does not, and may provide
added insight into reasoning on the autism spectrum.
A more deliberative approach to reasoning has been
proposed to characterise people with ASD compared to the
general population. For example, De Martino et al. (2008)
report that people with ASD reason in a more logically
consistent manner than matched controls. People with ASD
also request more information prior to making a decision
upon a probabilistic reasoning task compared to controls, a
style of reasoning that has been termed a ‘circumspect
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reasoning bias’ (Brosnan et al. 2014a). Similarly, those
from the general population who self-reported being higher
in autism traits also require more information prior to
making decisions when compared to those lower in autism
traits (Brosnan et al. 2013). This behavioural data is con-
sistent with self-reports from people with ASD about their
difficulties with rapid decision-making and reasoning and a
preference for more deliberation (Luke et al. 2012). Con-
trasting rapid decision-making/reasoning processes with
deliberative decision-making/reasoning processes forms
the basis of Dual Process Theory. When considering
human reasoning, Dual Process Theory has been a domi-
nant model within cognitive psychology for almost
50 years (Evans and Frankish 2009). The dual processes
are referred to as Type 1 and Type 2 and will be referred to
as intuition and deliberation (respectively) for convenience.
Intuition involves rapid, effortless, parallel, non-conscious
processing that is independent of working memory and
cognitive ability. Deliberation, on the other hand, involves
slower, effortful, sequential, conscious processing and is
heavily dependent on working memory and related to
individual differences in cognitive ability (see Evans 2011;
Evans and Stanovich 2013; Kahneman 2011; Stanovich
and West 2000, 2008; for reviews; see Keren and Schul
2009 for critique; see Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011 for
an alternative view).
Within Dual Process Theory, rapid autonomous pro-
cesses (‘intuitive reasoning’) are assumed to yield default
responses unless intervened upon by distinctive higher
order reasoning processes (‘deliberative reasoning’). Intu-
itive reasoning preceding deliberative reasoning is known
as the default-interventionist position (see Evans and Sta-
novich 2013; Kahneman 2011). One of the most widely
used behavioural assessments of intuition and deliberation
is the Cognitive Reflections Test (CRT: Frederick 2005).
The CRT comprises of three reasoning questions that have
both an intuitive (incorrect) and deliberative (correct)
response. A majority of intuitive responses are typically
provided for the CRT questions (Frederick 2005), which is
theorised to reflect the output from initial intuitive rea-
soning which has not been over-ridden by deliberative
reasoning. The over-riding of initial intuitive reasoning by
subsequent deliberative reasoning is demonstrated by
achieving the correct answer. In support of this, experi-
mental manipulations designed to encourage participants to
engage in deliberative reasoning reduces intuitive respon-
ses (Evans and Curtis-Holmes 2005).
Intuitive reasoning is also argued to be evidenced by
‘the framing effect’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) in
which logical decision making is influenced by the context
of the reasoning task. De Martino et al. (2008: 10746)
report a decreased susceptibility to the framing effect in
people with ASD, who demonstrate an ‘unusual
enhancement in logical consistency’. Within the context of
Dual Process Theory, De Martino et al. (2008) hypothesise
that individuals with ASD have an increased tendency
towards deliberation, attributable to impairment within
intuitive reasoning systems. This is consistent with Klin
and Volkmar (1997: 102) observations of people with
Asperger’s Syndrome as having ‘a deficient intuition and
lack of spontaneous adaptation’ (see Allman et al. 2005).
Klin et al. (2003) propose an embodied cognition ‘Enactive
Mind’ approach for understanding social adaptation, which
is argued to have important temporal constraints. Social
adaptation is reasoned to require the processing of salient
stimuli based upon split-second environmental demands
with moment-by-moment disregard of stimuli perceived as
irrelevant. Under this approach, people with ASD do not
reflect the typical processing bias towards socially relevant
stimuli.
In addition to the CRT behavioural measure, the
propensity to engage in intuitive and deliberative reasoning
can be assessed through self-report. The Rational-Experi-
ential Inventory (REI) is a widely used measure of intuition
and deliberation (Epstein et al. 1996). The Rational com-
ponent is based upon a ‘need for cognition’ (Cacioppo and
Petty 1982) which measures engagement in, and enjoyment
of, cognitive activities. The Experiential component was
developed to measure engagement and confidence in one’s
intuitive abilities and is termed ‘faith in intuition’ (Epstein
et al. 1996; Pacini and Epstein 1999). Epstein et al. argue
that these two information processing styles are indepen-
dent of one another, such that one can be high or low in
either or both dimension.
Deliberative responses on the CRT have been found to
positively correlate with REI self-reported deliberation and
negatively with REI self-reported intuition. Additionally,
intuitive responses on the CRT have been found to posi-
tively correlate with REI self-reported intuition and nega-
tively with REI self-reported deliberation (Pennycook et al.
2015). However, other studies have only reported the
positive relationship between deliberation on the CRT and
REI (Liberali et al. 2012; Thoma et al. 2015). Thus, the
variability between self-reported preference for intuition
and behavioural intuition needs to be borne in mind.
Freeman et al. (2012) found that combinations of high and
low intuition with high and low deliberation, as measured
by the REI, best predicted clinically relevant traits
(schizotypy) in a general non-clinical population. The lit-
erature above would suggest that autism traits in a general
population would best be predicted by a combination of
high deliberative and low intuitive reasoning styles.
The aim of the present research was to investigate
intuitive and deliberative reasoning across two studies that
focus on the autism spectrum; one involving a non-clinical
sample, and the other involving a clinical sample. As a
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continuum of autism traits is proposed to extend through-
out the (general and ASD) population, the relationship with
reasoning was examined in relation to relatively higher and
lower levels of autism traits. In the non-clinical sample it
was predicted that higher levels of autism traits would
relate to a profile characterised by greater deliberative and
reduced intuitive reasoning. Study 2 compared self-report
and behavioural measures of intuitive and deliberative
reasoning between people with and without ASD, and it
was predicted that the ASD group would show a more





Participants were 95 undergraduate students from a range
of disciplines (43 male, 52 female) aged 18–31 years old
(mean = 21.0, SD = 4.01, see Table 1) recruited at the
University of Bath. All participants were native English
speakers, and no participant reported a diagnosis of a
mental health condition. Participants were rewarded with
either course credit for their participation or received
£5.00. The research was approved by the Psychology
Departmental Research Ethics Committee at the University
of Bath, which implements the ethical guidelines of the
British Psychological Society.
Procedure
Autism traits were assessed using the AQ (Baron-Cohen
et al. 2001a, b), which is a self-report measurement that is
used to identify autism traits in clinical and non-clinical
adult populations. Participants rated their level of agree-
ment with 50 items (e.g. ‘‘I enjoy doing things sponta-
neously’’) on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0
(‘definitely disagree’) to 4 (definitely agree). A response in
the direction of autism characteristics is scored as 1, while
a response in the opposite direction is scored as 0. This
results in scores ranging from 0 to 50. The AQ in the
present study had a high level of internal consistency, with
a Cronbach’s alpha of .88.
Reasoning processes were assessed using the Rational
Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini and Epstein 1999). The
REI measures a participant’s preference for both intuitive
(experiential) and deliberative (rational) reasoning. The
REI is a 40 item questionnaire, containing 20 items that
assess intuitive reasoning and 20 items that assess delib-
erative reasoning. Examples from the intuitive scale
include, ‘‘I trust my initial feelings about people’’ and ‘‘I
often go on my instincts when deciding on a course of
action’’. Examples of items from the rational scale include,
‘‘I have a logical mind’’ and ‘‘I enjoy solving problems that
require hard thinking’’. Respondents score each item on a
5-point scale, from 1 = completely false to 5 = com-
pletely true. Mean scores for each subscale can therefore
range from 1 to 5 for each reasoning style. In the present
study the Cronbach’s alpha for the experiential-intuitive
scale was .91, and for the rational-deliberative scale it
was .88.
Results
The total scores for AQ, intuition and deliberation are
displayed in Table 1. There were no significant sex dif-
ferences for self-reported autism traits, intuition or delib-
eration (all p[ .05). Following Freeman et al. (2012), a
median-spilt method was used across both intuitive and
deliberative scores to divide the participants into one of
four groups: namely (1) high intuition/high deliberation;
(2) low intuition/low deliberation; (3) high intuition/low
deliberation; or (4) low intuition/high deliberation. (Free-
man et al. 2012). The numbers of males and females in
each group were: (1) 9:11; (2) 9:14; (3) 13:14; and (4)
12:13; which did not differ significantly (chi = .516,
p C .05).
A one-way ANOVA revealed that the high deliberation/
low intuition group had a significantly higher AQ total than
the low deliberation/high intuition group (F (3, 91) = 19.87,
p\ .01; all other comparisons p[ .05; see Fig. 1).
Table 1 Mean scores for age, autism traits (AQ) and reasoning (n = 95)
Measure Mean (SD) Min Max Male mean (SD) n = 43 Female mean (SD) n = 52
Age 21.00 (4.01) 18.00 31.00 21.14 (3.97) 20.21 (3.02)
Total AQ 20.00 (11.53) 4.00 45.00 18.60 (11.59) 19.35 (9.44)
Mean intuition 3.20 (.62) 1.75 4.10 3.15 (.70) 3.23 (.56)
Mean deliberation 3.51 (.61) 1.80 4.85 3.60 (.53) 3.44 (.66)
J Autism Dev Disord (2016) 46:2115–2125 2117
123
Discussion of Study 1
Study 1 examined the extent to which autism traits in a
non-clinical population were associated with self-reported
preferences for more deliberative over intuitive reasoning.
Results found higher autism traits in those with a profile
consisting of low intuitive and high deliberative reasoning,
compared to those with a high intuitive and low delibera-
tive profile of reasoning. Those with comparable levels of
self-reported intuitive and deliberative reasoning, whether
the levels were both high or low, did not differ from each
other in their levels of autism traits. Consistent with the
hypothesis, higher autism traits were associated with a
combination of greater deliberative and less intuitive rea-
soning styles. This is consistent with the clinical literature,
where ASD is associated with a more logical and circum-
spect reasoning bias (Brosnan et al. 2014a; De Martino
et al. 2008).
Interestingly, the present findings are the opposite
results to that reported by Freeman et al. (2012) for
schizotypy traits in the general population, where higher
levels of schizotypy traits were associated with high levels
of intuition combined with low levels of deliberation. This
opposing reasoning profile is consistent with the diamet-
rical model of Crespi and Badcock (2008), who propose
that ASD and schizotypy represent opposing poles of a
cognitive continuum. Thus a bias towards deliberative
reasoning and away from intuitive reasoning may charac-
terise reasoning associated with higher autism traits (with
the opposite pattern characteristic of higher schizotypy
traits). Whilst this analysis is useful for comparative pur-
poses, it is not intended to reify these groupings. Figure 1
highlights that the two reasoning style combinations con-
taining high intuition were associated with the lower levels
of autism traits and the two reasoning style combinations
containing low intuition were associated with higher levels
of autism traits. Study 1 therefore provided initial support
for autism traits within the general population being rele-
vant to Dual Process Theory. However, the REI provides a
self-reported reasoning preference rather than an assess-
ment of reasoning behaviour, although previous research
has suggested a correlation between the two (Liberali et al.
2012; Pennycook et al. 2015; Thoma et al. 2015). Study
Two extended the investigation to a clinical population
with Autism Spectrum Disorder and included a behavioural





Participants were 17 males with ASD and 18 typically
developing (TD) males without ASD who served as the
comparison group. The ASD group had a mean age of
18.4 years (range 17–21; SD = 1.3) and the TD group had
a mean age of 19.5 years (range 16–21; SD = 1.9; the
difference in age between groups did not reach statistical
significance (t(31) = 1.94, ns; see Table 2). The research
was approved by the Psychology Departmental Research
Ethics Committee at the University of Bath which imple-
ments the ethical guidelines of the British Psychological
Society.
The ASD Group comprised of participants attending a
University Summer School for students on the autism
spectrum focussed on providing an insight into university








High Intuion \ Low
Deliberaon
High Intuion \ High
Deliberaon
Low Intuion \ Low
Deliberaon

















**Fig. 1 Mean Autism traits by
the interaction of intuitive and
deliberative reasoning process.
**p\ .01
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provided evidence of clinic diagnosis of ASD using inter-
national criteria (DSM-IV, APA 1994; ICD-10, WHO
1992) by a qualified professional. ASD diagnosis was then
confirmed using the Social Communication Questionnaire
(SCQ-Lifetime; Rutter et al. 2003), a 40 item parent report
measure. The SCQ is a dimensional measure of ASD
symptomatology, with a sensitivity of .92 and specificity of
.62 (Witwer and LeCavalier 2008). In addition, the Ritvo
Autism Asperger Diagnostic Scale-Revised (RAADS-r;
Ritvo et al. 2011) was also utilised, which is an 80 item
self-report measure assessing four symptom areas: lan-
guage, social relatedness, sensory-motor, circumscribed
interests. The RAADS-r has a sensitivity of .97 and speci-
ficity of 1 (Ritvo et al. 2011). Scores on both measures were
significantly above the clinical cut-offs (Mean SCQ
score = 19.75, SD = 5.07, range 11–27; t(15) = 3.75,
p = .002; and mean RAADS-R score = 113, SD = 21.77,
range 65–140; t(16) = 9.09, p\ .001). The TD group was
an opportunity sample of male students commencing their
first year at the same university. TD participants completed
the AQ10, which is a ten item version of the AQ which can
be used for screening purposes. A cut off of 6 or greater
indicates a referral to diagnostic services may be appro-
priate (Allison et al. 2012). Scores ranged from 0 to 4, with
a mean of 2.1 (SD = 1.1) indicating the TD group did not
have a screening score warranting investigation for an ASD.
Procedure
The Rational-Experiential Inventory-Short (REI-S: Epstein
et al. 1996) was developed as a short version of the ques-
tionnaire used in Study One which contains 10 items,
equally divided between intuitive and deliberative sub-
scales. The short version was used as time was limited at
the Autism Summer School, however 6 members of the
ASD group still did not complete the REI-S.
The Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT: Frederick 2005) is
a widely used 3-item performance measure of intuition and
deliberation. Each question has a potentially intuitive and
deliberative answer, as well as the potential for wrong
answers. Scores can therefore range from 0 to 3 for each
subscale. (Note, the intuitive response is a wrong answer).
An example item is: ‘A bat and ball cost £1.10 in total. The
bat costs £1 more than the ball. How much does the ball
cost?’ The intuitive answer is 10 pence (cents in USA
version) and the deliberative answer (which is correct) is 5
pence. All other responses are considered wrong. Planned
t tests compared between group differences on the REI and
CRT, in addition to one-sample t tests comparing the CRT
to expected means.
Results
The means for each group are highlighted in Table 2.
Independent-samples t tests showed that the ASD group
provided more deliberative and less intuitive responses
than the TD group on the behavioural CRT measure (see
Fig. 2). Cohen’s d analysis indicated medium to large e
effect sizes. Since a mean of 1.5 represents the middle
neutral point of responding between intuitive and deliber-
ative responses on the CRT, one-sample t tests were carried
out for the CRT scores of each group to see if they were
significantly responding towards one style or the other.
Results highlighted that the TD group means did not sig-
nificantly differ from the middle neutral value (both
p[ .05). For the ASD group, both the number of intuitive
(t(16) = 3.56, p\ .01) and deliberative responses
(t(16) = 2.38, p\ .05) differed from the middle value 1.5;
see Fig. 2). 8 incorrect responses were provided by the TD
group and 5 by the ASD group which were not analysed
(this number did not significantly differ between groups
(t(32) = .93, ns).
Further t tests also showed the ASD group self-reported
significantly lower levels of intuition than the TD group
using the REI (t(27) = 3.67, p\ .001). There was also a
trend for the ASD group to self-report higher levels of
deliberation than the TD group (t(27) = 1.7, p\ .1), see
Fig. 3.
Table 2 Means (and SD) for
ASD and TD groups for
demographics and dual process
self-report and behavioural
measures
Demographics and variables Group t Cohen’s d [95 %CI]
ASD (n = 17) TD (n = 18)
Age 18.4 (1.3) 19.5 (1.9) 1.94
CRT-intuition .71 (.92) 1.41 (1.1) 2.07* .69 [.00–1.40]
CRT-deliberation 2.00 (.87) 1.12 (.99) 2.76** .94 [.24–1.52]
REI-intuition 2.84 (.89) 3.80 (.53) 3.67*** 1.40 [.42–1.50]
REI-deliberation 4.09 (.70) 3.63 (.71) 1.70 .65 [-.09 to 1.01]
Cohen’s d effect size, with 95 % Confidence Intervals
* p\ .05, ** p\ .01, *** p\ .001. 6 participants with ASD did not complete the REI
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Discussion of Study 2
Study 2 demonstrated, for the first time, that young male
adults with ASD responded on the CRT in a less intuitive
and more deliberative manner. The task is not purely
ipsative as it is also possible to make errors. However,
providing an intuitive answer does necessitate that a
deliberative answer is not provided. The REI (short) is not
ipsative (in that one could self-report being high in both),
and again lower intuition was evidenced in the ASD group
along with a trend towards higher deliberation. Taken
together, the data are consistent with a Dual Process The-
ory account of ASD as a bias away from intuitive reasoning
and towards deliberative reasoning (Brosnan et al. 2014a;
De Martino et al. 2008). The term ‘bias’ is appropriate as
those with ASD tended to respond intuitively half as often
as TD participants and respond deliberatively twice as
often as TD participants. This is clearly different to only
responding in a deliberative manner. It may suggest
intuitive processes can be employed by those with ASD,
though just not as frequently or easily as TD participants.
Dual Process Theory proposes that intuitive processes
represent default responses unless intervened upon by
deliberative processes (Evans and Stanovich 2013). De
Martino et al. (2008) hypothesise that a logical reasoning
bias in ASD is attributable to impairment within the intu-
itive reasoning mechanisms and the evidence of limited
intuitive responding by those with ASD in the present
study is consistent with this.
General Discussion
Two studies explored the relationship between Dual Pro-
cess Theory of human cognition and reasoning on the
autism spectrum. People with high autism traits and those
diagnosed with ASD showed a pattern of having a com-
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reasoning styles. Both those with high autism traits and
those with a diagnosis of ASD consistently responded less
intuitively and more deliberatively, when compared to
those with low autism traits and without a diagnosis of
ASD, on behavioural and self-report assessments of rea-
soning. Taken together, the results suggest that Dual Pro-
cess Theory provides a useful framework for considering
the strengths and weaknesses in reasoning on the autism
spectrum. De Martino et al. hypothesised that those with
ASD may have compromised intuitive reasoning, based
upon those with ASD demonstrating enhanced logical
consistency. Consistent with this, this is the first study to
demonstrate enhanced deliberative responding explicitly in
those with ASD and those with high autism traits, which is
consistent with enhanced logical consistency or a circum-
spect reasoning bias (Brosnan et al. 2014a; De Martino
et al. 2008).
Within the default-interventionist perspective of dual
process theory (see Evans and Stanovich 2013; Kahneman
2011), intuitive processes are assumed to yield default
responses unless intervened upon by distinctive higher
order reasoning processes (deliberative). There are at least
three potential explanations for the present findings: (1)
those with ASD have impaired intuitive mechanisms and
consequently deliberative reasoning is dominant; (2) intu-
itive mechanisms are intact but dominated by deliberative
reasoning; or (3) Intuitive mechanisms are intact in dif-
ferent contexts but this context triggers deliberative rea-
soning in those with higher levels of autistic traits. Under
this Dual Process model, a slower, effortful, sequential,
deliberative reasoning style would be dominant in ASD as
a consequence of impairment in rapid, effortless, parallel
intuitive mechanism (De Martino et al. 2008), though the
possibility remains that this may be due to dominant
deliberative reasoning (possibly within the context of the
task). Either way, higher autism traits would be associated
with a propensity to engage in deliberative reasoning rather
than being associated with deliberative reasoning abilities
per se (e.g. a greater preference for deliberative reasoning
within an individual does not necessarily entail greater
deliberative skills within that individual). This is consistent
with Luke et al. (2012) who found that those with ASD did
not self-report a greater reliance upon a rational/delibera-
tive reasoning style. However, people with ASD self-re-
ported that they have difficulties making decisions quickly,
which is consistent with the idea of an impairment in the
rapid reasoning that characterises intuition.
It should be noted that the intuitive response is actually a
wrong choice, despite being the dominant response in
highly educated American college students (Frederick
2005). A propensity to engage in deliberative reasoning
within a context that typically triggers erroneous intuitive
reasoning can be seen as an advantage associated with
ASD (and potentially higher autism traits). Toplak et al.
(2011, 2014) provide an extensive analysis of the correlates
of the CRT with other reasoning tasks, however there are
no tasks which assess intuition independently of delibera-
tion. Within the CRT, intuitive reasoning results in erro-
neous responses and could therefore be regarded as a
deficit within this context that people with ASD do not
demonstrate to the same degree as the general population.1
Toplak et al. (2011, 2014) argue that the CRT is a unique
predictor of susceptibility to biases. As biases occur
through the application of heuristics rather than engaging
in further analytic processing, Toplak et al. describe the
CRT as a particularly potent measure of ‘miserly’ cognitive
processing (or ‘lazy thinking’, Kahneman 2011: 48).
Defaulting to the reduced processing demands of being a
cognitive miser has been argued to be typical in many
contexts (cf. Fiske and Taylor 1991). From this perspec-
tive, ASD is associated with not being cognitively miserly
(or lazy thinking), and the proposed reasoning bias is best
characterised as being unbiased (within the context of the
CRT at least).
Thus, in the present study, the ASD group obtained
more correct answers than the TD group which is consis-
tent with the literature identifying a diminished framing
effect in ASD (De Martino et al. 2008). The deliberative
score on the CRT relates to a wide range of rational rea-
soning tasks (Lesage et al. 2013; Sirota et al. 2014; Toplak
et al. 2011, 2014). However, whilst self-reported intuition
can negatively correlate with rational reasoning (Shiloh
et al. 2002), apart from the intuitive subscale of the REI,
assessments of intuition are rare (see Pennycook et al.
2015). The proposed advantages in a greater propensity
towards deliberative reasoning in ASD may have an
associated cost on intuitive reasoning. However, this was
not independently evidenced in this study as we did not
have a behavioural measure of intuition independent of
deliberation. Recall also, the variation in findings regarding
the relationship between behavioural and self-reported
intuition in the general population identified in the litera-
ture, which may indicate that the intuitive subscale of the
REI is not a reliable index of intuitive behaviour.
Despite issues with assessment, potential biases away
from intuitive reasoning in other contexts, such as social
contexts, may be pertinent to ASD as they may be asso-
ciated with deficits in empathy (e.g. Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright 2004). The social world often requires rapid
processing of social cues occurring in an uncertain context
rather than an overt ‘rule-based’ system. Within their
Enactive Mind approach, Klin et al. (2003) characterise the
social world as an ‘open domain task’ requiring an
understanding of the relative significance of a multitude of
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
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elements, the importance of which are dependent upon the
context of the situation. Future research can develop the
extent to which a propensity towards deliberative pro-
cessing within naturalistic social settings is too slow and
effortful to allow for effective participation. As Darius
(2002: 25; cited in Davidson 2008) recounts: ‘There is no
such thing as adequate delayed social reactions. One is
either quick enough to keep up, or one is weird and socially
disabled’. Rapidly and automatically extracting emotional
information from social environments is argued to be an
intuitive process that feeds ‘downstream’ empathy pro-
cesses and related social–emotional functioning (Clark
et al. 2008; Kahneman 2011; see also Rump et al. 2009;
Tracy et al. 2011). Thus, the unbiased use of deliberation
identified in the present research may relate to the social-
emotional weaknesses which form part of the diagnostic
criteria for ASD. Consistent with this, the measures on
intuition used in the present study have been found to
correlate with measures of empathy in a general population
(Brosnan et al. 2014b). Dual Process Theory may therefore
extend beyond reasoning to provide a fuller account of the
social cognition that characterises ASD (see Evans 2008;
Sherman et al. 2014).
Thus a bias towards deliberative reasoning within Dual
Process Theory may provide an account of the strengths
associated with ASD. Dual Process Theory therefore might
usefully bring to bear additional cognitive research from
non-clinical groups pertaining to how combinations of
intuition and deliberation may relate to ASD. For example,
the default-interventionist position could characterise the
application of deliberative reasoning in ASD to typically
intuitive tasks such as emotion recognition (‘corners of
mouth turned down, lowered eyebrows = sad’: Rutherford
and McIntosh 2007; Walsh et al. 2014; see also Brosnan
et al. 2015b; Golan and Baron-Cohen 2006; Golan et al.
2010). Within Dual Process Theory, intuitive tasks such as
rapid emotion recognition, would be expected to be inde-
pendent of working memory and cognitive abilities in a
general population, but not in an ASD group who were
utilising deliberative reasoning (see Harms et al. 2010, for
review of the evidence for this). Physically slowing stimuli
would also be predicted to enhance the performance of
those utilising deliberative reasoning strategies (see Gepner
et al. 2001; Tardif et al. 2007; Gepner and Fe´ron 2009).
Typically, intuitive and deliberative reasoning can be
applied as appropriate to the perceived demands of the
reasoning context. The present study is consistent with the
idea that those with ASD do not have the balance of rea-
soning styles but have a bias towards deliberative reason-
ing and away from intuitive reasoning across contexts.
There may be contexts where this is beneficial (e.g.
mathematics) and contexts where this is detrimental (e.g.
social).
Interestingly, Freeman et al. (2012) also propose an
imbalance in reasoning styles is related to schizotypy traits
in a non-clinical population sample. Freeman et al. found
that higher intuitive reasoning combined with lower
deliberative reasoning was related to the degrees of
schizotypy traits, which is the opposite pattern to that
associated with autism traits in the present study. Those
with high levels of schizotypy have also been found to bias
towards making decisions rapidly (‘jumping to conclu-
sions’; Freeman 2007; Freeman et al. 2008; Garety et al.
2005, 2007) again reflecting the opposing pattern to higher
autism traits and ASD identified in the present study.
Schizotypy was not assessed in the present study, but it is
interesting to speculate that variation in the relative biases
towards intuition and deliberation within Dual Process
Theory may represent a framework within which similar-
ities and differences between these clinical conditions and
associated traits across the general population can be fur-
ther explored (see Crespi and Badcock 2008; see also
Brosnan et al. 2010; Chisholm et al. 2015 for review).
Within the non-clinical population, the extent to which
individuals engage in intuitive or deliberative reasoning
has been found to be susceptible to manipulation. For
example, being told to ‘think carefully’ or to write down
details of how you came to a decision have been found to
elicit more deliberative responses, where as being
instructed to go with a ‘gut-feeling’ has been found to elicit
more intuitive responses (e.g. Dijkstra et al. 2012; Usher
et al. 2011). However, if reasoning in ASD is characterised
by diminished intuitive mechanisms, whether such
manipulations would affect those with ASD is an open
question future research. Further, there is also the intrigu-
ing possibility that even if people with ASD were shown
not to employ rapid, effortless, parallel, non-conscious
processing (‘intuition’) in social contexts they may default
to them in other contexts (e.g. there are alternative ‘open
domain tasks’; Klin et al. 2003).
There were limitations to the present research. All of the
participants were at university or intending to go to uni-
versity and were therefore not reflective of either the ASD
or non-clinical populations as a whole. This may relate to
the lack of sex differences in Study One. The sample was
also not specified in terms of further demographics, such as
social economic status, which limits generalisability. The
participants in Study 2 were all considering attending
university, and the degree of ASD symptomology was
likely mild and the findings may not extend to the whole
autism spectrum. Study 2 only compared male participants
which is another limitation of the study, especially given
the relatively little understanding of female populations
with ASD (Halladay et al. 2015). In addition, only 11
participants with ASD completed the REI in Study 2, and
the potential for a Type 1 error needs to be borne in mind.
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Whilst the CRT is a widely used measure of intuitive and
deliberative responding, it should be noted that the intuitive
response is wrong. Other wrong responses are not consid-
ered intuitive and are not typically analysed (hence the task
is not purely ipsative). Analysing errors may provide useful
insights into whether they emerge from intuitive or delib-
erative reasoning (Brosnan et al. 2015a). In addition, the
terms intuition and deliberation have been used for stylistic
convenience, but it should be noted that they refer to two
clusters of concepts (Type 1 and Type 2 respectively, see
Evans 2008 for a review; see Keren and Schul 2009 for
critique; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011 for an alternative
view) that share similarities, but also have differences,
within each cluster. Finally, an independent assessment of
IQ was not undertaken, which is a major limitation of the
study. Whist intuitive reasoning is argued to be indepen-
dent of cognitive abilities, deliberative reasoning is not.
The participants were studying at the same educational
level (A-levels, examinations typically taken at 18 years of
age for University entry) though may not attain the same
grades. Future research can address the assessment of
cognitive ability. Although college students do not neces-
sarily have higher levels of autism traits than random
control groups, those studying sciences (including mathe-
matics) have been shown to have higher levels of autism
traits than those studying humanities and social sciences
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2001a, b), which can also be explored
in future research.
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